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STATE CONSERVATION REGULATION
AND
THE PROPOSED R-199*
KENNETH HEADYt
On May 22, 1961, the Federal Power Commission issued two
notices of proposed rule making, designated as Docket Nos. R-199
and R-200. Docket No. R-199' proposed to delineate certain pro-

visions which would be acceptable in long-term gas sales contracts
between producers and pipeline companies and to prohibit the use
of contractual provisions inconsistent with those proposed. Docket
No. R-200 2 proposed to establish certain quality and delivery requirements for so-called pipeline quality gas and to provide for centsper-mcf deductions from the applicable area ceiling prices in instances where the actual quality and delivery conditions did not meet
the proposed standards.
The proposed regulations in Docket No. R-200 are for all practical purposes limited to price considerations. For that reason they
would appear to have no greater or lesser relationship to state conservation regulations than any questions of price determination. The
regulations proposed in Docket No. R-199, on the other hand, are
centered upon contract provisions establishing the daily contract
quantity, minimum take-or-pay-for provisions, rights of the purchaser to take in excess of the contract quantity, and make-up periods
for the receipt by the purchaser of gas previously paid for but not
taken. These contractual provisions in effect grant to the purchaser a
measure of control over the rate at which the seller may produce his
gas.
Control of production lies at the core of state conservation regulations. For that reason, any actual or potential conflict between the
proposed regulations in Docket No. R-199 and the various state
conservation regulations presents a matter for serious consideration and study by the state conservation agencies.
Section I (b) of the Natural Gas Act, after enumerating the par* This paper was first presented as an address to the Legal Committee of the
Interstate Oil Compact Commission, 1965 Midyear Meeting, June 21, 1965, Pittsburgh,
Pennsylvania.
t Assistant General Attorney, Phillips Petroleum Company, Bartlesville, Oklahoma.
1. 26 Fed. Reg. 4615 (1961).
2. 26 Fed. Reg. 4614-615 (1961).
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ticular sales to which the Act shall apply, concludes with the phrase
"but shall not apply . . . to the production or gathering of natural
gas." 3 Broad as that last phrase once appeared to be, I think there
would be general agreement that the various United States Supreme
Court decisions over the past few years construing the Natural
Gas Act have tended, and have been intended, to narrow the scope
and effect of that exemption. In the famous Phillips case, in which
the Court held that the Commission does have jurisdiction to regulate independent producers, the Court held that the phrase "production and gathering" does not exempt sales of natural gas.4 Both
before and after that decision the Court has emphasized that the
exemption of production and gathering is limited to the physical
activities of those operations.5 Whether the proposed regulations
in Docket No. R-199 will operate to bring about a further narrowing of that exemption is a matter of more than passing concern.
The original proposal in Docket No. R-199 specified four types
of contractual provisions which would be acceptable in producer
sales contracts. The first of these provided that the daily contract
quantity should not exceed one mcf for each 8000 mcf of original
dedicated recoverable reserves. The next provided that the annual
quantity of gas to be paid for by the buyer if not taken should not
be greater than 80% of the daily contract quantity multiplied by
the number of days in the year. Next, the buyer could be required to
take no more than 75 % of the daily contract quantity in any one
day but should be permitted to take, as a minimum, 125% of the
daily contract quantity in any one day. The last provision required
that the buyer be given the right to receive at no additional charge
gas paid for but not taken at any time during the twelve-month
period immediately following the payment for such gas not taken.
Shortly after the issuance of the notice of proposed rule making
in Docket No. R-199, the Commission issued an amendment to
the notice, providing for the inclusion of the following: "However,
it should be noted that the provisions hereinafter proposed would
be applied consistent with and not at variance to applicable conservation orders of State commissions. '
The notice issued by the Commission provided for the filing of
3. 52 Stat. 821 (1938), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 717(b) (1964).
4. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Wisconsin, 347 U.S. 672 (1954).
5. For the most recent expression by the Court, see United Gas Improvement Co.
v. Continental Oil Co., 381 U.S. 392 (1965).
6. 26 Fed. Reg. 5690 (1961).
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comments by interested parties. Numerous producers, pipeline companies, gas distributing companies, and state regulatory agencies
responded. Their comments covered a wide range of subjects, too
numerous to detail here. The producers were virtually unanimous in
opposing the proposed regulations. The pipeline companies were in
almost the same position, with an overwhelming majority generally
opposing the regulations, though a few pipeline companies did support the regulations, some suggesting the adoption of even greater
restrictions upon the freedom of the parties to contract. Generally,
the gas distributing companies and the state regulatory agencies from
the consuming states either supported the regulations as proposed or
suggested further restrictions. With the exception of the Kansas
Corporation Commission, which urged that the proposed regulations could conflict with its conservation regulations, the various
state conservation agencies did not respond to the Commission's
invitation to comment.
Following the filing of comments by the interested parties, the
proceeding lay dormant for almost four years. From time to time
the Commission did condition certificates granted to producers with
language such as the following:
The certificates of the producer applicants referred to above are
conditioned so

that the take-or-pay requirement in each contract is

subject to the provisions of the Commission's final order in Docket
No. R-199 as of the effective date of that Order, provided, however,
that the producers shall not be required to file take-or-pay provisions
7
for less than 80 per cent of the annual contract quantities.

On March 16, 1965, Docket No. R-199 again showed signs of
life. On that date the Commission issued an amended notice of
proposed rule making in the docket proposing certain changes in the
proposed rules and undertaking to explain to some extent the reasoning behind the proposed changes.'
In the amended notice, the Commission retained the proposed
daily contract quantity of one mcf for each 8000 mcf of original
dedicated recoverable reserves but eliminated the requirement that
the annual quantity of gas to be paid for by the buyer, if not taken,
should not exceed 80% of the daily contract quantity. The prohibitions against requiring the purchaser to take more than 75%
7. Texaco Seaboard Inc., 29 F.P.C. 593, 600 (1963).
8. 30 Fed. Reg. 3715-716 (1965).

NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL

[VOL. 6

and against limiting his permissible take to less than 125% of the
daily contract quantity were retained, but to that paragraph the
Commission would add the following phrase: "Subject to the ability
of the well to deliver without impairment of recoverability."
The right of the buyer to receive, at no additional charge, gas
paid for but not taken would be extended by the amended notice
from twelve months to five years, "subject to contract provisions
to protect against drainage." If the contract would terminate before
the end of the five-year make-up period, a shorter make-up period
would be permissible.
The last paragraph of the amended notice provided: "Paragraph
(a) of this Section shall be applied to the extent feasible in a manner
consistent with applicable conservation orders of state commissions."' Comments filed with the Commission in response to the
amended notice generally followed the pattern of comments on the
original notice. Some of the state conservation agencies filed comments to this amended notice. The number of pipeline companies
generally opposing the proposed regulations seems to have increased somewhat. Without specifically referring to this rule-making
proceeding, six major pipeline companies sponsored testimony in
the Southern Louisiana area rate proceeding, Docket No. AR61-2,
by Mr. Roger D. Stanwood, Vice President in charge of Gas Supply,
Transcontinental Gas Pipeline Corporation, opposing uniform quantity, quality and delivery provisions prescribed by the Federal Power
Commission. That same testimony has since been incorporated into
the record of the Hugoton-Anadarko and Texas Gulf Coast area
rate proceedings, Docket Nos. AR64-1 and 64-2, on behalf of the
pipeline purchasers appearing in those proceedings. The effect of
this is that practically every major pipeline company, through Mr.
Stanwood, has now expressed its opposition to regulations of this
type.
Almost without exception, the producers originally took the position that the Commission did not have the power to issue the proposed regulations. This position was based upon the producers' interpretation of the Supreme Court's decision in the Mobile case.10
The Court there held that the Natural Gas Act was not intended to
limit the right of the regulated natural gas companies to negotiate
individual contracts and that the basic power of the Commission
under Sections 4(e) and 5 (a) of the Act was "simply the power to
9. Id. at 3716.
10. United Gas Pipe Line Co. v. Mobile Gas Service Corp., 350 U.S. 332 (1956).
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review rates and contracts made in the first instance by natural gas
companies and, if they are determined to be unlawful, to remedy
them." Based upon this decision, the producers reasoned that any
attempt by the Commission to prescribe contract provisions by general regulation would constitute an attempt by the Commission to
make contracts rather than simply to modify contracts made in the
first instance by the natural gas companies. In the view of most
producer lawyers, the proposed regulations were well beyond the
powers of the Commission and therefore invalid.
It appears now, however, that the Commission does have the
power to issue such regulations. In FPC v. Texaco Inc.," the Court
upheld the application by the Commission of regulations prohibiting
the inclusion of certain types of escalation provisions in producer
contracts. The specific issue in that case was whether the Commission had properly rejected a certificate application by Pan American
Petroleum Corporation containing the prohibited contractual provisions. 1 2 Pan American contended that the rejection of its certificate
application without a hearing violated Section 7 of the Natural Gas
Act, which specifically provides for hearing on certificate applications. The court held that "the statutory requirement for a hearing
under § 7 does not preclude the Commission from particularizing
statutory standards through the rule-making process and barring at
the threshold those who neither measure up to them nor show
reasons why in the public interest the rule should be waived."'" The
Court held further that the opportunity to comment on the proposed regulations constituted all the hearing that was required.
In substance, the court held that the rules established in the rulemaking proceeding were binding without further inquiry in the
certificate proceeding and that the producer was not a proper applicant unless it complied with those regulations.
There would seem to be no basis for distinction between the
general regulations upheld in the Texaco case and those which are
proposed in Docket No. R-199. On that basis, I conclude that the
proposal to establish permissible contract provisions relating to
quantity and take-or-pay requirements does not exceed the power of
the Commission.
11. 377 U.S. 33 (1964).
12. A corresponding certificate application of Texaco was also rejected, but the
Court held that venue for review of Texaco's proceeding lay in another circuit and
therefore Texaco's petition for review should have been dismissed. 377 U.S. at 37-39.
13. 377 U.S. at 39.
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The significance of the Texaco decision extends beyond the question of the validity of the proposed regulations. The effect of the
Texaco decision is to provide a means for the Commission to establish general rules in proceedings which are not subject to judicial review and then to apply those general rules as binding concepts in
later proceedings.
It is now firmly established that a Commission order establishing
general regulations such as here proposed is not reviewable under
Section 19 of the Natural Gas Act.' 4 In addition, the Tenth Circuit
has specifically held that Section 10 of the Administrative Procedure
Act' 5 does not authorize review of Commission actions by any procedure other than under the Natural Gas Act.'" Section 10 of the
Administrative Procedure Act provides that every agency action
shall be subject to review, either in the form prescribed by statute
applicable to the particular agency or, in the absence or inadequacy
of such form of review, by any applicable form of legal action. Notwithstanding its holding that Section 19 of the Natural Gas Act does
not permit review of rule-making orders, the Tenth Circuit specifically held that the review provisions under Section 19 are not inadequate within the meaning of Section 10 of the Administrative
Procedure Act. These decisions, coupled with the Supreme Court's
decision in the Texaco case to the effect that a producer is not a
proper applicant unless it complies with existing general regulations,
would seem to offer to the Commission a course of action which
would go far toward insulating at least some of its actions from judicial review.
But even if some other court should hold that Section 10 of the
Administrative Procedure Act is applicable, or that the general regulations may be reviewed in the course of reviewing subsequent action
which relies on those regulations, the probability of such general
regulations being subjected to close judicial scrutiny seems remote.
Section 4 of the Administrative Procedure Act does not require that
the agency support its general rules by specific findings of fact. All
that is required is "a concise general statement of their basis and
14. Texaco Inc. v. FPC, 317 F.2d 796 (10th Cir. 1963), rev'd on other grounds,
377 U.S. 33 (1964); Sun Oil Co. v. FPC, 304 F.2d 293 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 371,
U.S. 861 (1962); United Gas Pipe Line Co. v. FPC, 181 F.2d 796 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
denied, 340 U.S. 827 (1950); Hunt Oil Co. v. FPC, 306 F.2d 878 (5th Cir. 1962)
Amerada Petroleum Co. v. FPC, 231 F.2d 461 (10th Cir. 1956).
15. 60 Stat. 243 (1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1009 (1964).
16. Amerada Petroleum Co. v.FPC,231 F.2d 461, 465 (10th Cir. 1956).
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purpose."' 7 The rule is well established that administrative regulations are presumed valid and that the burden is upon the person
attacking them to show their invalidity.'" Invalidity of general regulations is not established by showing that the agency went beyond
the record of the rule-making proceedings.'"
The difference in results which can flow from the use of general
rule-making proceedings as opposed to evidentiary hearings is illustrated by the Commission's action in the so-called "Btu case. ' ' 20 In
its notice issued in Docket No. R-200, the Commission had proposed
that pipeline quality gas should have a minimum heating value of
1000 Btu's per cubic foot, with proportionate downward price adjustments for gas having a lower Btu content. That notice specifically
provided that no upward adjustments in the area ceiling prices would
be permitted for provisions more favorable to the buyer. In other
words, no price bonus would be allowed for gas containing more
than 1000 Btu's per cubic foot.
Apparently because the proposed standards in R-200 have never
been actually adopted, and because of the fact that a number of contracts were signed in Anadarko Basin of Oklahoma and Texas providing for upward Btu adjustments, the Commission consolidated a
number of producer certificate applications for consideration of the
specific question of the propriety and applicability of these upward
Btu adjustments. The hearings in these proceedings were lengthy.
There was extensive evidence offered by the producers, by the Commission staff, and by distributing company intervenors. There was
ample opportunity for cross-examination. Following the close of
hearings, briefs were filed and a comprehensive examiner's decision
17. 60 Stat. 238 (1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1003 (1964).
18. United States v. Obermeier, 186 F.2d 243 (2d Cir. 1950), cert denied, 340
U.S. 951 (1951).
19. New York Foreign Freight Forwarders & Brokers Ass'n v. Federal Maritime
Comm'n, 337 F.2d 289 (2d Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 910 (1965) ; Pacific Coast
European Conference v. United States, 350 F.2d 197 (9th Cir. 1965). In Pacific Coast,
the court stated:
It is apparent that in rule making hearings the purpose is to permit the
agency to educate itself and not to allow interested parties to choose the issues
or narrow the scope of the proceedings. The purpose of the notice is to allow
interested parties to make useful comment and not to allow them to assert their
,rights' to insist that the rule take a particular form. The agency, in rule
making, can look beyond the particular hearing record since it otherwise would
be unable to draw upon its expertise.
350 F.2d at 205.
20. Texaco Inc., FPC Opinion No. 464 (June 10, 1965) (mimeo.).
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was issued. Exceptions to the examiner's decision were filled by some
of the parties and oral argument was held before the Commission.
On June 10, 1965, a unanimous Commission issued its order upholding the contract provisions providing for upward price adjustments for gas having a heat content in excess of 1000 Btu per cubic
foot. The evidence showed, and the Commission expressly found, that
the purchase of high Btu gas by the pipeline companies in that area
was necessary and desirable for the purpose of blending it with the
large quantities of low Btu gas found in the area, thereby enabling
the pipeline companies to utilize the low Btu gas. The Commission
found that "unless the pipeline is in a position to offer a reasonable
premium for the higher Btu gas, the producers will have a strong
economic interest to extract high Btu hydrocarbons from their gas
' 21
before delivery to the pipeline.
Whether the same conclusion would have been reached if the
Commission had had before it only the written comments in the rulemaking proceeding is of course a matter of speculation. In my judgment, the likelihood is that it would not. The extensive record in
the Btu case made it possible to determine in precise detail how and
why this particular contract provision served a useful purpose. The
Commission's decision in that case does not constitute Commission
action in Docket No. R-200, but as the Commission noted, "As to
R-200 the investigation herein provides useful information for decision there." It would be most surprising if the Commission would
now arrive at a different result in R-200.
One suggestion sometimes offered in rebuttal to critics of the general rule-making approach is that the way is always open to apply to
the Commission for an exception to applicable general regulations.
The Supreme Court in the Texaco case, for example, pointed out
that the producer had made no attempt to seek a waiver of the general regulation even though the Commission's rules authorized a request for such a waiver.22
To me, this approach is more theoretical than practical. The request for a waiver necessarily comes after the general regulations
are an accomplished fact. The number of waivers granted would
normally be relatively few in number. The granting or denying of a
waiver is essentially a matter for the discretion of the Commission
21.
22.

Id. at 10.
FPC v. Texaco Inc., 377 U.S. 33, 40-41 (1964).
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and the courts will be reluctant to interfere with that discretion.2 3
I have discussed at some length, and perhaps belabored, the general rule-making approach in order to emphasize the fact that it does
not appear that the effect of the rules proposed in Docket No. R-199
upon state conservation regulations has ever been adequately presented to the Federal Power Commission. As I pointed out earlier,
the Kansas Corporation Commission was the only state conservation
agency filing comments on the original notice. Many of the producers
did raise the question of possible conflict with state conservation
regulations. These comments were at least sufficient to cause the
Commission to amend its original notice in Docket No. R-199 to add
a provision that the regulation "would be applied consistent with and
not at variance to applicable conservation orders of state commissions." It is doubtful, however, that this suggested deference to state
conservation regulations will serve to eliminate all conflict.
I do not mean to suggest that there will be an inevitable head-on
clash between these proposed regulations of the Federal Power
Commission and the state conservation regulations. Such conflicts
should be avoided, and the Federal Power Commission has indicated
that it intends to try to avoid them. Nevertheless, the adoption of
the regulations proposed in Docket No. R-199 would provide a
wide area of potential conflict and would offer the opportunity for
much litigation over whether an actual conflict did exist. In the unhappy event of an actual conflict, there is grave danger that, despite
the Federal Power Commission's seeming deference to state regulations, it would be the state conservation regulations which ultimately
would yield.
I will not try to detail all of the possible areas of conflict. There
are a few areas in which the potentiality of conflict appears obvious.
Under the proposed R-199 contract provisions, the only basis
for determination of daily contract quantity is the "original dedicated recoverable reserves." On the other hand, state proration
orders which establish an allowable production are by no means
limited to any single factor. By statute, the state agencies are both
23. NLRB v. Warrensburg Board & Paper Corp., 340 F.2d 920 (2d Cir. 1965);
NLRB v. Marshall Maintenance Corp., 320 F.2d 641 (3d Cir. 1963) ; NLRB v. Ideal
Laundry & Dry Cleaning Co., 330 F.2d 712 (10th Cir. 1964). In Ideal Laundry, the
court said: "[W]e must respect the wide discretion of the Board, to determine in any
case whether an exception should be made to its prescribed rules and regulations."
330 F.2d at 718.

NATURAL

RESOURCES JOURNAL

[VOL. 6

directed and permitted to consider a number of different factors."
It would be most surprising if the application of these various factors would result in the same allowable production as the contract
quantity based upon the "original dedicated recoverable reserves."
The concept of quantity in relation to reserves is completely inapplicable as applied to casinghead gas. This was pointed out to the
Commission in a number of written comments filed with the Commission in response to the first notice. The amended notice, however,
makes no mention of casinghead gas and provides no exception for
it. On its face, this proposed regulation would be as applicable to
casinghead gas as to gas from gas wells. In order to avoid a conflict,
the regulation would either have to be considered inapplicable to
casinghead gas because of the general reference to state conservation
regulations or some application for a special exception would have
to be filed with regard to each contract for the sale of casinghead
gas. Neither approach offers much certainty at the present time.
The proposed five-year make-up of provisions for gas paid for
but not taken is another area of potential conflict. Balancing periods
under state proration regulations vary in determination and duration, but none of them extends for as long as five years. If the deferral of takes by the pipeline company extends beyond the applicable
balancing period, the underage in allowable production is likely to
be cancelled." Two or three or four years later when the pipeline
company comes to take its gas previously paid for but not taken,
that gas may not be available under then current allowables.
The proposed make-up provisions will undoubtedly be the subject
of litigation at some point in time on another ground. The proposed
regulation would permit the contract to provide that the five-year
make-up would be "subject to contract provisions to protect against
drainage." The normal contract provisions protecting against drainage generally requires an increase in the required takes, over the
otherwise established daily contract quantity, in the amount required
to compensate for drainage. If the regulation permits the inclusion
of such an increased quantity requirement, or at least limits the application of the make-up provisions if the purchaser has not protected the seller from drainage, then perhaps no conflict with state
24. Kan. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 55-703 (1963) ; La. Rev. Stat. Ann, § 30:41 (1950);
N.M. Stat. Ann. § 65-3-13 (c) (Repl. 1960); Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 52, § 87.1 (Supp.
1965) ; Tex. Rev. Stat. Ann. art. 6008, § 13 (1962).
25. Republic Natural Gas. Co. v. State Corp. Comm'n, 173 Kan. 172, 244 P.2d 1196
(1952).
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conservation regulations will result. If this regulation is interpreted
to mean that the contract quantity can in no event exceed the onefor-eight requirement, even to protect against drainage, and that
the buyer must in any event be given the opportunity to make up gas
paid for but not taken, then some conflict seems inevitable. State conservation statutes often expressly have as their purpose the prevention of drainage not compensated by counter-drainage. The proposed Federal Power Commission regulations, at least in some situations, could be construed to bring about the opposite result.
Application of these regulations could also result in premature
abandonment of isolated wells or failure to develop areas remote
from pipeline locations. Oftentimes a particular field will be so remote from a pipeline connection that it is uneconomical for the pipeline to connect to wells in that field without demanding compensation
in the form of a reduced price paid for the gas. To offset the effects
of the reduced price, however, the pipeline company may agree to take
the gas from the field at an accelerated rate, thereby increasing the
present worth of the gas. This is usually a satisfactory arrangement
to both parties and makes possible the connection of many isolated
and marginal fields. Under the proposed regulations, however, the
pipeline would be prohibited from committing itself to the more rapid
takes. It is to be assumed that in some of these situations a special
exception to the regulations might be obtained, but the cost of obtaining a special exception would mean an additional financial burden
upon an already marginal situation.
Any consideration of these potential conflicts immediately presents the question whether similar conflicts do not already exist between contract provisions and state conservation regulations. After
all, the proposed Federal Power Commission regulations merely undertake to prescribe permissible contract regulations. It might therefore appear that there would be no greater incidence of conflict under
these proposed regulations than already exists.
It is true, of course, that there are many conflicts between contractual provisions and state conservation regulations. But it is well
established that, in the events of such conflicts, it is the state conservation regulations which control and the contractual provisions
which must give way. Under the proposed Docket No. R-199, however, something new would be added. That something new would be
the fact that these contractual provisions would exist, not merely as
the result of agreement between private parties, but as the result of
deliberate action taken by a federal regulatory agency.
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The supremacy of regulation by the Federal Power Commission
over state regulation was demonstrated in Northern Natural Gas
Co. v. State CorporationComm'n.26 In that case, the Supreme Court
held that ratable purchase orders issued by the Kansas Corporation
Commission invaded the exclusive regulatory domain of the Federal
Power Commission and were therefore invalid. In the course of its
opinion, the Court said:
These state orders necessarily deal with matters which directly affect
the ability of the Federal Power Commission to regulate comprehensively and effectively the transportation and sale of natural gas,
and to achieve the uniformity of regulation which was an objective of
the Natural Gas Act. They
therefore invalidly invade the federal
agency's exclusive domain.27
Later in its opinion the Court said:
The federal question does not arise from an asserted actual and immediate conflict between the federal and state regulations. The question iswhether the state orders may stand
28 in the face of the pervasive
scope of federal occupation of the field.
I emphasize that these quotations are merely isolated sentences
taken from an opinion in which the Court was careful to point out
that the specific vice of these particular orders was that they were
directed to interstate purchasers, as distinguished from producers,
and in which the Court specifically recognized the power of the
states to conserve their natural resources. These sentences do, however, accent the Supreme Court's apparent concern in effectuating
complete regulation of independent producers by the Federal Power
Commission. In June, 1965, in holding that sales of gas leases to an
interstate pipeline company constituted a sale of gas subject to the
Commission's regulations, the Court said: "A regulatory statute
such as the Natural Gas Act would be hamstrung if it were tied down
' 29
to technical concepts of local law."

The quoted sentence from the Northern case applied in a different context might or might not bring about a different result. The
26. 372 U.S. 84 (1963).
27. Id. at 91-92.
28. Id. at 97-98.
29. United Gas Improvement Co. v. Continental Oil Co., 381 U.S. 392, 400 (1965).
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point here is that it would provide the basis for a plausible legal
argument that state conservation regulations should not be permitted to limit the application of contractual provisions adopted in specific compliance with federal regulations under the Natural Gas Act.
If the proposed regulations in Docket R-199 are adopted, sooner or
later some producer or purchaser dissatisfied with the effect of state
conservation regulations upon his contract will assert that contracts
adopted in compliance with these federal regulations are immune
from interference by state conservation regulations. Whatever the
outcome, that contention will require serious consideration when it
is presented.
Another uncertainty regarding the effect of these proposed regulations upon state conservation activities is the attitude of the Commission itself. Despite the assurances which appear to be given in
the proposed regulations that no effect upon state conservation regulations is contemplated, an analysis of the Commission's language
reveals some disturbing aspects. The original notice, as amended
June 20, 1961, contained the flat statement that the standards proposed "would be applied consistent with and not at variance to applicable conservation orders of state commissions. ' ' 30 The present
amended notice contains the explanatory statement that "any rule
which may be adopted would not be applied in conflict with state conservation orders." This particular statement was made in connection
with the five-year make-up provision and possibly could be limited to
that provision, but for present purposes let us assume that it is intended to have general application. The disturbing factor is that this
broad statement is not incorporated in the language of the proposed
regulations.
The regulations as presently proposed would include this language
as Section 154.103 (b) : "Paragraph (a) of this section shall be applied to the extent feasible in a manner consistent with applicable
conservation orders of state commissions." 31
This is a decided change from the prior statement that the standards "would be applied consistent with and not at variance to applicable conservation orders of state commissions." The insertion of
the phrase "to the extent feasible" injects a significant limitation
upon the possible operation of state conservation regulations. Why
30.
31.

26 Fed. Reg. 5689-690 (1961).
30 Fed. Reg. 3715-716 (1965). (Emphasis added.)
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the change occurred, and exactly what is meant by it, is not explained. The fact that the language is there indicates that the Commission now contemplates that there may be some situations-not
now determined-in which state conservation regulations would interfere with the Commission's regulation of producers under the
Natural Gas Act. The clear implication is that in such a situation,
if it should exist, state conservation regulations must bow to the
supremacy of the federal regulations.
The time for filing written comments with the Commission has
expired, but there is still time for the state Conservation agencies to
give serious concern to these proposed regulations. There may still
be opportunity for the states to make their views known.
I do not believe it would be possible for the state conservation
agencies to anticipate all of the possible conflicts which might result
from the adoption of these proposed regulations and to suggest
language to avoid those conflicts. It may be too late for the state
agencies to protect themselves after the regulations have been issued and conflicts have developed.

